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In this paper we analyze the behavior of an official who is elected
democratically rather than being appointed exogenously. To this aim,
we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party
punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenar-
ios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We
find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections
in both scenarios. The increase in punishment is larger in the more
cooperative scenario although differences are not statistically signifi-
cant. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the
least severe candidate.
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In many real-life social systems, the decisions affecting virtually all members
of society are made by elected representatives. Representative democracies
are the most salient example, but similar voting systems can be found at the
level of firms, classes, clubs and so forth. Given the prevalence and impact
of such institutions, it is crucial to understand the motivations behind the
decisions of elected officials. Could we expect that officials who compete to
be elected behave differently that officials who do not face this competition?
We exploit the methodology of laboratory experiments to analyze the conse-
quences on policies when policy makers are elected in a political competition
process.
To achieve this aim, we analyze third-party punishment in a public goods
game (PGG, henceforth). In the first stage of this game, a group of exper-
imental subjects simultaneously decide how much to contribute to a public
good. In the second stage, the contributions from the first round are shown
to a different group of subjects who then have the opportunity to deduct
points from the first group of subjects. We compare the benchmark case -
PGG with punishment - with an extension in which punishers face elections
after deciding how much to punish. In a third stage, other subjects (who
differ from contributors and punishers in the first PGG) vote in pairwise
comparisons to decide which of the punishers from the first PGG they prefer
to be their punishers in a second PGG with punishment they will play. To
do so, they are provided with the proposed punishment policies from the first
PGG.
PGG provides an appropriate framework for real-life electoral processes
since it represents social dilemma situations in which the pursuit of individ-
ual interests enters into conflict with the maximization of social welfare.1 In
this kind of situation, the implementation of a sanctioning institution that
punishes individual behavior if it deviates from the welfare maximizing ac-
tion is a widely used solution to prevent norm violation.2 In fact, many
1Since deducting points is costly, theory predicts that no punishment occurs in the
second stage and, consequently, no one contributes in the first stage, while the efficient
outcome is full contribution without any punishment.
2There is extensive experimental evidence that in the absence of the punishment op-
tion, contributions in the PGG decline over time and become virtually zero, whereas the
punishment device leads to full cooperation after a few experimental rounds (see Fehr and
Gachter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2001 and Henrich et al., 2006 for experimental evidence,
or Chaudhuri, 2007 for a survey). The literature has shown that punishment also exists
in situations where the punisher is not “hurt” by the norm violation (the main difference
between the results found in second-party and third-party punishment is that the latter
is less severe (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004 or Charness et al., 2009, among others).
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common-pool resource regimes around the world rely on sanctions and there
is agreement in the literature that an effective sanctioning system is a major
determinant of the success of such regimes (see, for example, Ostrom, 1999).
At the state level, legal systems control and enforce norm adherence. In
the international arena, well-known examples also exist. For instance, the
EU Stability and Growth Pact was created to enforce budgetary discipline
among EU member states, while the Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions by implementing legally binding agreements. In all
these cases, sanctions are imposed by a central authority, which is elected
democratically.
We focus on the differences in punishment behavior between the baseline
- where the electoral process is absent - and the situation in which subsequent
elections take place. In the former, punishment is due to individuals’ dislike
of the norm violation since subjects punish without any possible material
reward. When third-party punishers face an electoral process they may ob-
tain an extra future potential payoff in case of winning. Selfish third-party
punisher would want to capture the vote of the majority in order to get this
material payoff. To do that they must foresee the preferences of voters on
punishment.
The level of norm violation observed may be a useful source of data for
candidates to predict voters’ preferences on punishment. For instance, if the
group to punish is very cooperative candidates may expect that voters want
a severe punishment to deviators. To check this hypothesis we perform the
experiment with two groups of contributors: One relatively more cooperative
and another considerably less cooperative.
Our results are as follows. First, we observe that punishers spend their
money by punishing non-cooperative behavior without any future reward.
Nevertheless, punishment behavior increases significantly when subjects face
a subsequent election. This suggests that candidates believe that voters
prefer a severe punisher in order to enhance cooperation and adjust their
behavior accordingly.
Second, we observe that this increase in punishment is larger for low
contribution levels, while there seems to be only a negligible effect on the
punishment of highly contributing individuals. However, when we compare
the effect of elections on punishment in a more cooperative and a less coop-
erative group of contributors we do not find significant differences.
Finally, we also find that voters prefer candidates who punish less severely.
It is common for participants in the first round of a PGG not to want any
enforcement mechanism such as punishment (see for instance Gürerk, Irlen-
busch and Rockenbach, 2006). However, this result seems to be contradictory
to candidates’ expectations on voters preferences on punishment.
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Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related
with the literature that addresses experimentally third-party punishment in
PGG. Most of the papers in this topic focus on the effects of a third-party
punishment in the level of cooperation (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, Char-
ness et al., 2009, or Kroll, Cherry, and Shogren, 2007 among others). In our
paper, we focus exclusively in punishment behavior ignoring its consequences.
At this regard, Lopez-Perez and Leibbrandt, 2011, find that egalitarian mo-
tives play an important role in third-party punishers’ behavior. Moreover,
they find that third-party punishment is correlated with the degree of in-
equality between the third party and the punished party. They only consider
altruistic third party punishers. In our work, we focus in the possible change
in the punishment when third-party punisher are elected rather than be solely
altruistic.
Since we introduce electoral process in our experiment, our paper is also
related to some extent with the literature dealing with laboratory experi-
ments in political economy (Palfrey, 2009) and political science (Green and
Gerber, 2003). In particular, we deal with motivations of candidates which
traditionally are in standard political economy models: The probability of
winning and the policy finally implemented (see Downs, 1957 and Wittman
1973). However, we do not focus in this topic as it is well done by Morton
(1993) to explain policy divergence in elections. We just use the standard
framework in political economy to analyze the potential change in policies
when these are the outcome of political competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A theoretical framework is
presented in Section 2. Then, the main hypotheses tested in the experiment
are presented in Section 3, followed by a detailed explanation of the experi-
mental design in Section 4. The main results of the experiment are provided
in Section 5, while concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we define a simple theoretical framework based on the stan-
dard political competition theory. We assume that there are two candidates,
labeled by i = 1, 2 . Each candidate is endowed with the same positive
amount of money w > 0. Both candidates decide simultaneously the share
of her endowment devoted to a policy proposal that affect voters’ welfare.
Let xi be the cost of candidate i’s policy proposal, such that xi ≤ w. Can-
didates care about their private consumption and about the policy proposal.
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Moreover, we assume that each candidate has an ideal public policy associ-
ated to a cost xi. Later, we will refer to xi as the ideological view about
the public policy for candidate i.Without taking into account the cost of the
policy in terms of private consumption, by deviating from their ideal policy,
candidates make them worse off. Finally, candidate i’s utility depends on
the outcome of the elections. For the sake of simplicity, we define candidate
i’s utility function as follows:
Ui(xi)
⎧⎨⎩ αi(w − xi)− βi(xi − xi)
2 if i loses
αi((w − xi) + k)− βi(xi − xi)2 if i wins
where αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0 states for the relative importance of candidate
i’s private consumption and policy respectively; and k states for the price of
winning the election. Let assume that in the case of tie, the breaking rule is
that both candidates win with equal probability. Notice also that we assume
that the policy proposal xi is costly independently on the outcome of the
election. That can be interpreted as both policy proposal are implemented,
so consequently, both candidates may reduce their private consumption no
matter the outcome of the election.3
Notice also that if there was no election, and a dictator decided the policy
implemented, the utility-maximizer policy for a dictator will be xdi = xi− αi2βi .
That is, the dictator’s ideal policy corrected by the relative importance of
private consumption over public policy. Therefore, we can state the following
result:
Result 1 The optimal cost of public policy for a dictator, xdi , is such that
i) it is always smaller or equal than the cost of her ideal policy, xi, i.e.
xdi ≤ xi.
ii) it is increasing in the cost of her ideal policy xi,




Consider now the case of elections. Given a pair of policies (x1, x2), let
P (x1, x2) be the perceived probability that candidate 1 wins the elections. We
assume that both candidates have the same information about the probability
of winning, so 1− P (x1, x2) will be the perceived probability that candidate
3We can justify this assumption interpreting the cost of the policy as the cost of the
candidate’s electoral campaign.
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2 wins the elections. Moreover, let P (x1, x2) be a differentiable function in
the domain ]0, w[2.Then, if both candidates maximize their expected utility
to decide their policy proposal before election takes place, we obtain the
following candidates’ best reply functions:
xe1 = x1 −
α1
2β1
(1− ∂P (x1, x2)
∂x1
k)







From this expression we can state the following result.
Result 2 If both candidates believe that an increase in their expenditure
in public policy increases their probability of winning the election, i.e.
∂P (x1,x2)
∂x1
> 0 and ∂[1−P (x1,x2)]
∂x2
> 0, then the expenditure in public policy
is higher under elections than in the dictator case.
The competition for the reward from winning the election may lead can-
didates to expend more or less money than what they would expend in the
case of being dictators. We refer to this difference of money as the level of
opportunism of a candidate. 4Then, the higher the difference (in absolute
terms) between a candidate’s expenditure under elections and a candidate’s
expenditure when she is the dictator, the higher the level of opportunism.
By the expression of candidate i’s best reply function, candidate i’s level












. Thus, both i) the effect
of the expenditure on the perceived probability of winning, and ii) the price of
winning the election, increases the level of opportunism of both candidates.
In the next section, we design an experiment to test weather there exists
opportunism in candidates decisions about policy.
3 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted at the University of Granada with 198 par-
ticipants, who were recruited via posters in the Faculty of Economics. All
sessions were run in the lab using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). No
one was allowed to participate in more than one session. On average, each
participant received around 13.18€ for a one-hour session. The experiment
4The standard definition of opportunism in political economics is the art of seeking
victory in elections without regard for the policy implemented (see Downs, 1957).
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consisted of two stages in Treatment 1 and five stages in Treatment 2. At the
end of the experiment all the subjects filled out a questionnaire to allow us to
control for potential heterogeneity across subjects and study the pure effects
of our treatment variations. In what follows, we explain the experimental
design in more detail.
3.1 Treatment 1: Non-Voting
3.1.1 Stage 1: Public Goods Game
The first stage was the standard PGG. This is a n-player game in which every
player i = 1, ..., n is given an initial endowment of w experimental points and
has the opportunity to contribute an amount of ci units to a public good,
0 ≤ ci ≤ w. For a given contribution profile (c1, ..., cn), the payoff function
for player i is given by:






< r < 1.
The parameter r determines the marginal per capita return from a con-
tribution profile. Given a contribution profile, a player is always better off
contributing zero to the public goods game. Thus, the unique Nash equilib-
rium is (0, ..., 0) .
In the experiment, we followed standard values used in the experimental
literature, setting w = 50 experimental points and r = 0.1. The conversion
rate for points to euros was 100:1 (100 points = 1€).
The PGG was played by four groups of 20 subjects (n = 20). Each
subject made one decision that was valid for 48 rounds. The reason for
including this feature will be explained later in Stage 2. From each group
we have then 48 identical contribution profiles. Table 1 shows an example of
the structure of the data collected from a single group playing the PGG (i
states for contributor and R stands for round).
Table 1. Contribution Profiles
i\R 1 2 3 ... 48
1 c1 c1 c1 c1 c1
2 c2 c2 c2 c2 c2
3 c3 c3 c3 c3 c3
... ... ... ... ... ...
20 c20 c20 c20 c20 c20
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In order to test the robustness of our results, we chose the most con-
tributing and the least contributing groups from the four groups of subjects
in Stage 1, which we label cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios through-
out the paper.5 To avoid deception, we did not tell the subjects in Stage 1
that the group shown to the punishers would be chosen randomly. Rather,
they were only informed that two out of four groups would be punished in the
following stages, without specifying any selection criteria. The histograms of
the contributions in the two selected groups are reported in Appendix 2.
3.1.2 Stage 2: Punishment
Two groups of different punishers were shown the corresponding contribution
profiles: Cooperative or non-cooperative. The punishers were endowed with
100 points and had to decide how many points they wanted to sacrifice in
order to reduce points from the participants in the previous stage (PGG). For
each point the punishers used, 3 points were reduced from the contributors’
accounts. Punishers could sacrifice any amount from 0 to 100 to punish each
contributor, as long as the sum was or equal than 100. At the end of the
experiment the punishers were paid for the points they kept.6
As the aim of this work is to study how the fact of participating in an elec-
toral process may affect punishment, we need to compare punishment with
and without a voting procedure. We also need to have the same contribution
profile in order to compare both situations. So, once we have the contri-
butions for each subject, we implement the punishment as follows. Each
participant punished one round of the PGG.7 Therefore, if we have 24 pun-
ishers per treatment (with and without voting), we need 48 rounds to assure
that each participant in the punishment stage can punish one of the rounds.
As the contribution profile must be the same for all punishers, we told par-
ticipants in the PGG that their decision would be valid for 48 rounds.
3.2 Treatment 2: Voting
Treatment 2 consists of five stages. The first stage of Treatment 2 coin-
cides with that in Treatment 1. In Stage 2, punishers were presented the
same contribution profiles (from cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios)
5The term “non-cooperative scenario” does not refer to the situation in which nobody
contributes . We use the term non-cooperative rather than low contribution scenario to
avoid confusion with low contributions throughout the text.
6The instructions for the punishment stage in the voting treatment are provided in
Appendix 1. Instructions for other stages or treatments are available upon request.
7Punishers did not know the number of punishers.
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as punishers in the non-voting Treatment. Thus, we can compare punishment
of the same contribution profile with and without a voting procedure. The
only difference with respect to Treatment 1 is that second-stage punishers in
Treatment 2 were informed that the subsequent stages included an election
process.
3.2.1 Stage 3: Voting
In Stage 3, a new group of participants (who were different from those in
Stage 1) had to select punishers for a second PGG with punishment in which
(i) they will be contributors themselves and (ii) the elected subjects from
Stage 2 will perform the role of punishers. To do so, the second-stage punish-
ers were matched in pairs to compete in elections using a simple majority rule.
The reward was 200 experimental points (20 Euros), which would be given to
the winners of the election process to perform the role of punishers in a sec-
ond PGG with punishment. Voters had information about each candidate’s
punishment policy in Stage 2, together with the payoffs of contributors before
the punishment had been implemented. There were 12 competing pairs that
were randomly generated from the second-stage punishers and voters had to
decide which candidate they preferred from each pair of punishers.
All the participants were fully informed of the details of the election
process, as well as the amount provided (200 points) for the second PGG
punishment.
It is important to note that the second-stage punishers had no information
about the preferences of “voters”. They only knew the contribution profile
of the group of first-stage contributors they were about to punish.8
3.2.2 Stage 4: PGG II
In this stage, the voters from Stage 3 played a new PGG with punishment.
They knew that their decisions would be observed by 12 elected represen-
tatives from Stage 3, who would have the opportunity to reduce their final
points. The difference in this case with respect to stage 1 is that the con-
tributors were punished with a probability of one. There were two groups
of 11 subjects, one of which was punished by the punishers from the coop-
erative scenario and another which was punished by the punishers from the
non-cooperative scenario. Participants in this PGG were endowed with 50
points and the conversion rate was 100:1 (100 points = 1€).
8Punishers were explicitly told that the information given to them concerned only the
group they had to punish in Stage 1, rather than the voters or other participants in the
experiment.
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3.2.3 Stage 5: Punishment II
In the fifth stage, elected punishers repeated the role of punishers. They
were shown the contributions from Stage 4 and were allowed to use the 200
points they had earned by winning the elections to punish the contribution
behavior of participants in Stage 4.
Table 2 summarizes the game structure, treatment differences and the
number of participants in the experiment.
Table 2. Summary of the experimental design
Game T1 (Non-Voting) T2 (Voting) Scenario N (T1/T2)
Stage 1 PGG 1 Yes Yes 80
Stage 2 Punish. 1 Yes Yes Coop. 22 / 26
Non-coop. 24 / 24
Stage 3 Voting proc. No Yes Coop. - / 11
Non-coop. - / 11
Stage 4 PGG 2 No Yes - / 22(Stage 3)
Stage 5 Punish. 2 No Yes - / 24(Stage 2)
TOTAL 198 subjects
4 Hypotheses
In this section we describe the two main hypotheses that were tested in the
experiment.
Hypothesis 1: In the case of no electoral process, there is no punishment.
The intuition behind Hypothesis 1 is coming from the equilibrium be-
havior of self-interested individuals. This hypothesis is related with Result
1 stated in the Theoretical Framework section. If policy designers are only
interested in private consumption, they will not expend resources in public
policy. In our experiment that means that under costly punishment a pure
self-interested individual does not spend money in punishment if there is no
material reward.
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Hypothesis 2: There may exist punishment when punishers are involved in
an electoral process.
The intuition of Hypothesis 2 stems from the idea that candidates have
preferences for winning the election. Hence, we expect them to punish or
not in order to maximize the probability of winning. If punishers anticipate
that voters prefer a real threat of punishment they will punish free-riders
(more than they would have punished them if they were not to be voted)
in order to win the elections. However, if they expect that voters will favor
the least severe punisher then they will not punish at all. An argument in
favor of the former result comes from the fact that the most efficient outcome
(although not a Nash equilibrium) is that everyone contributes the maximum
and punishment is not necessary. If there is a real threat of punishment,
voters will contribute more to the public good, achieving a more efficient
outcome for the society. This hypothesis is related with Result 2 stated in
the Theoretical Framework section.
5 Results
In this section, we report the results of the experiment. First, punishers’
behavior is analyzed. As a secondary result, we focus on voters’ performance.
5.1 Punishment policies in Stage 2
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 lists the average amount of experimental currency points spent on
punishment, providing an overall picture of punishment behavior in each
treatment. The rows correspond to the contribution scenarios, while the
columns represent the non-voting and voting treatments, respectively. As
can be seen, subjects spent twice as many points in the voting treatment
than in the non-voting treatment. The differences are highly significant,
independently of the level of the punished contribution profile (z = −2.900,
p = 0.002 and z = −3.012, p = 0.001 for non-cooperative and cooperative
scenarios, respectively).9 On the other hand, there is no statistical difference
between contribution profiles (z = −0.204, p = 0.419 and z = −0.368, p =
0.357 for voting and non-voting, respectively).
9All reported tests are Mann-Whitney one-tailed tests, unless stated otherwise.
11
Table 3: Average amount of points spent on punishment
non-voting N voting N
non-coop. 14.88 24 35.41 24
coop. 15.55 22 35.92 26
Table 4 shows the fraction of punishers spending zero. This behavior
corresponds to the equilibrium behavior of self-interested individuals. These
fractions are larger for the non-voting treatments (z = −3.628, p = 0.000 and
z = −3.318, p = 0.001 for the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios,
respectively). Table 4 reveals some differences between the cooperative and
the non-cooperative scenarios, although they are not statistically significant
(z = −0.661, p = 0.255 and z = −0.508, p = 0.306 for voting and non-voting
treatments, respectively).
Table 4: Fractions of punishers spending 0 points
non-voting N voting N
non-coop. 54.16% 24 8.33% 24
coop. 40.90% 22 3.80% 26
To provide further insight into the treatment effects, we have to take
into account the punishment in relation to individual contributions. To do
so, Figure 1 plots the average amount of money spent on punishment as
a function of the corresponding contribution levels. The y-axis depicts the
number of punishing points, while the x-axis lists the contribution levels.
The left (right) panel of Figure 1 reports the results for non-cooperative
(cooperative) scenarios.
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Figure 1. Average punishment by contribution levels
(a) Non-cooperative scenario (b) Cooperative scenario
In contrast to Tables 3 and 4, Figure 1 reveals more details about punish-
ment behavior. First, the more individuals deviate from a certain cooperation
norm, the more serious is their punishment on average. This effect is present
under all treatment conditions and is consistent with the experimental evi-
dence (see Fehr and Gachter, 2004).
Concerning the effect of the electoral process, Figure 1 confirms that there
is considerably more punishment in the voting treatment. Again, this effect
is statistically significant (z = −2.140, p = 0.016 and z = −2.086, p =
0.018 for non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios, respectively). However,
we observe that this effect is larger for low contribution levels, while there
seems to be only a negligible effect of the electoral process on the punishment
of highly contributing individuals. The difference between the punishment
behavior in the voting and non-voting treatments seems to increase as the
contribution levels decrease. This suggests that the role elections plays in
punishers’ behavior increases with the deviation from the contribution norm.
5.1.2 Econometric analysis
In this section, we provide an econometric analysis of the above findings. We
estimate eight econometric models. The variables used for all the analyses are
the treatment dummies, voting and coop, and their interaction, voting×coop.
Formally, votingi = 0(1) for the non-voting (voting) treatment subjects and
coopi = 0(1) for the non-cooperative (cooperative) scenario. We also control
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for individual heterogeneity.10 The results are summarized in Tables 5 and
6.
Table 5. OLS and Probit estimations
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Voting 61.63** 36.90* 0.41** 0.27**
(23.80) (17.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Coop 2.01 -20.52 0.09 -0.01
(18.86) (15.61) (0.10) (0.07)
Voting × Coop -0.49 9.95 0.01 0.04
(31.46) (25.16) (0.19) (0.08)
Constant 44.63** 63.88** - -
(15.15) (23.33) - -
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes
Prob > F( κ2) 0.003 0 0 0
(pseudo) R2 0.138 0.514 0.227 0.603
N 96 96 96 96
[1] and [2] are OLS, dependent variables are # of points spent. [3] and [4] are Probit
(marginal effects reported), dependent variables are 0 for subjects who spent 0 points.
Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis; ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
We first focus on estimations [1-4] reported in Table 5. These estimations
do not take into account the structure of punishment. Rather, they analyze
the global feature of punishment in the data. In estimations [1] and [2], the
dependent variable is the amount of points each subject spent on punishment.
In estimations [3] and [4], the dependent variable is a dummy variable which
equals zero for individuals who have not spent any points on punishment, and
takes the value of one for those who have punished a strictly positive amount.
Given the nature of the variables, we estimate ordinary least squares and a
probit model in the corresponding regressions.11
Table 5 confirms that there is an increase in punishment and in the prob-
ability of punishing when individuals face elections, and that there is no
10We control for gender, altruism, risk aversion, life satisfaction and intelligence.
11We have also conducted a tobit estimation to test the robustness of the OLS model,
finding that the results are qualitatively the same. The coefficient for voting is in fact
higher, but the significance level remains the same. For the second estimation model, logit
regressions provide very similar results.
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difference between the non-cooperative and cooperative scenario in terms of
points spent on punishment. Quantitatively, we observe that voting increases
the number of punishing points by around 37 (3.7€) in the voting treatment.
In terms of the likelihood of punishing, people are 27% more likely to punish
when they face an electoral process.
An interesting question is whether the total effect of voting differs across
the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. We observe that this is not
the case, since the interaction dummy Voting × Coop is never significant.
As a result, the increase in punishment due to the presence of the election is
alike in the two contribution scenarios.
Conditioning the analysis on corresponding contribution levels in line with
Figure 1 provides a more detailed account of the data. Recall that there are
96 subjects in total in the punishment stage and that each of them had to
make 20 decisions; one for each contributor. Hence, the data set constitutes a
panel. In estimations [5-8] of Table 6, we provide the estimates of a random-
effect panel-data model.12 The dependent variable is the punishment level
in [5] and [6] for each corresponding contribution. In [7] and [8], we estimate
the probability of punishing a particular contribution profile, where the de-
pendent variable is 0 if the corresponding contribution was not punished by
individual i and 1 otherwise. The models contain the regressors from estima-
tions [1-4] plus two contribution-related variables. The variable contribution
corresponds to the punished contribution level and contribution sq. is the
contribution squared. We added the latter because Figure 1 suggests that
there is a non-linear relation between punishment and contribution.
12The Hausman test confirms that it is safe to use a random-effects model (p = 1).
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Table 6. GLS and Probit random-effects estimations
[5] [6] [7] [8]
Contribution -0.164** -0.164** -0.057** -0.057**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Contribution sq. 0.002** 0.002** -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Voting 1.033** 0.623* 1.337** 1.447**
(0.336) (0.265) (0.483) (0.501)
Coop 1.104** 0.729* 1.384** 1.327**
(0.273) (0.214) (0.329) (0.477)
Voting × Coop -0.014 0.159 -0.057 -0.255
(0.516) (0.418) (0.674) 0.672
Constant 2.500** 2.821** -0.600* -0.903
(0.242) (0.421) (0.329) (0.669)
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes
Prob > κ2 0 0 0 0
(overall) R2 0.279 0.377 - -
N 1920 1920 1920 1920
[5] and [6] are GLS random effects; dependent variable is # of points spent. [7] and [8] are Probit
random-effects estimations; the dependent variable is 0 for subjects who spent 0.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 and 5% level, respectively.
The conclusions of these estimations differ only slightly from the "global"
view above. Punishment is non-linearly decreasing in the contribution level.
The presence of the electoral process elevates the punishment. Punishment is
larger in the cooperative scenario than in the non-cooperative scenario when
controlling for the contribution punished. However, the treatment effect
of voting is not statistically different when comparing the two contribution
scenarios.
5.2 Voters’ behavior
To analyze voters’ behavior, some statistical descriptors are shown in order
to provide a general idea of how voters elected their candidates with the
information they had about the punishment.
We report the average amount of points spent on punishing each of the
contributions made by the winners and losers of the voting procedure. Recall
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that candidates were matched in pairs for the electoral process. For both con-
tribution scenarios, the average amount spent by winners is unambiguously
lower than the amount spent by losers, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2a: Punishment by winners



























Figure 2b: Punishment by winners



























Voters prefer candidates who punish less severely. Although this result
seems to be contradictory to the intuition that voters will vote for candi-
dates who punish more, it is common for participants in the first round of
a game to choose people who do not punish.13 Only when subjects know
other subjects’ behavior in the first stage they do realize that the threat of
punishment will increase cooperation and vote for more severe punishers. As
this experiment was designed as a one shot game, we only observe the first
part of the behavior. Thus, we find that candidates who punish less win the
election.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze the potential change in third-party punishment
when punishers are elected democratically rather than being appointed ex-
ogenously. We do that by exploiting experimental methodology in a PGG
with punishment. Candidates have to propose norm-enforcing policies in a
13Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006) analyze contribution behavior in a PGG
where participants can choose to be in either a punishment or a “free” environment. They
found that 63% of subjects chose not to be in the punishment condition in the first round.
This sharply contrasts with the percentage (close to 100%) they observe in the final rounds.
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social dilemma under two different conditions. In the first condition, candi-
dates’ policies are evaluated by the public via elections, while no evaluation
takes place under the second condition.
We find that although people punish even in the absence of elections, the
punishment is significantly higher when candidates face an electoral process.
Moreover, this increase in punishment is larger for low contribution levels,
while there is only a negligible effect on the punishment of highly contributing
individuals. However, there are not significant differences when we compare
the effect of elections on punishment in a more cooperative and a less coop-
erative group of contributors.
The results reported here support the standard political competition as-
sumption that candidates care about winning the election. We are aware
that this is a modest exercise. However, more recent models assume that
candidates also care about the policy finally implemented, that is they care
about ideology. Quantify the relative importance of these two factors in can-
didates’ utility remains as the natural continuation of this work. By doing so
we will compliment the existing field-data analyses such as the one in Levitt
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7 Appendix 1. Experimental Instructions (Stage
2. Punishment,Voting Treatment)
Welcome to our experiment.
- This sheet contains the instructions for the experiment.
- You are not allowed to speak with the rest of the participants during
the experiment. If you need something, please raise your hand and wait in
silence. We will attend to you as soon as possible.
- We are now going to show you the decisions made by participants in a
previous experiment.
- The previous task was as follows. Each participant had an initial en-
dowment of 50 tokens. The participants had to decide how many points they
were going to keep and how many points they were going to put in a group
account. Subjects’ payoffs depended on their decisions and also on the deci-
sions made by other members in their own group. The payoffs were the sum
of two parts: i) the number of points the subjects decided to keep and ii) the
profits obtained from the group account. We will now show you four different
examples of how to compute payoffs in groups composed of four subjects.
EXAMPLE 1: Let’s assume that we have a group of four subjects. Each
subject has 50 tokens. The profits from the group account can be computed
as 0.4 × total, where total represents the sum of the contributions to the
group account by all members in a specific group. If the four subjects put 50
tokens in the group account, the final payoffs obtained by each subject will
be as follows:
group account tokens kept total group account profit group account payoff
50 0 200 0.4*200=80 80
50 0 200 0.4*200=80 80
50 0 200 0.4*200=80 80
50 0 200 0.4*200=80 80
In this particular example, every subject makes money exclusively from
the group account. As everybody contributes the same amount to the group
account, the final payoffs are the same for everyone.
EXAMPLE 2: Imagine we have the same situation as above. The only
difference is that one subject puts 50 tokens in the group account and the
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other three subjects put 0 tokens. The final payoffs obtained by each subject
are shown in the table below.
group account tokens kept total group account profit group account payoff
50 0 50 0.4*50=80 20
0 50 50 0.4*50=80 70
0 50 50 0.4*50=80 70
0 50 50 0.4*50=80 70
In this example, only the first participant contributes to the group ac-
count. So, the payoffs of the first subject are different from those of the other
three.
EXAMPLE 3: In this case one subject puts 0 tokens in the group account
and the other three subjects put 50 tokens. The final payoffs obtained by
each subject are shown in the table below.
group account tokens kept total group account profit group account payoff
0 50 150 0.4*150=60 110
50 0 150 0.4*150=60 60
50 0 150 0.4*150=60 60
50 0 150 0.4*150=60 60
So, as you can see, individuals’ payoffs depend on their decision and on
the decisions made by other members of their group.
- Your task is as follows: You have 100 points. These points will be
converted into euros at a rate of 10 points=1 euro. On your screen you will
find the contributions made by each of the 20 members of a group to the
group account in one period. You can use all, some or none of your points
to reduce the points obtained by the participants in a round of the previous
experiment.
- If you decide to deduct points from one of the participants in the previous
experiment, for each point you spend, 3 points will be deducted from the
points obtained by that participant. That is, if you use 4 points to reduce
someone’s points, 12 points will be deducted from their total number of
points. If you use 8 points to reduce someone’s points, 24 points will be
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deducted from their total number of points. You can use your points to reduce
anyone’s points. You can reduce points from more than one participant in
the previous experiment.
- Only one restriction applies: you cannot spend more than the 100 points
you have.
- The final number of points for all participants will be calculated as
follows:
- You will obtain: 100 points − the points you spent.
- The subject whose points you reduced will get: the points obtained
in a period during the previous experiment − 3* the points you have spent
in deducting his/her points.
- The subject whose points you have not reduced will get: the points
obtained in a period during the previous experiment .
Second Stage.
- Once you have made your decision, you are going to participate in a
different experiment.
- You will be randomly matched with some of the other participants in
the room who have done the same task as you. We will show your decision
and your partner’s decision (anonymously) to a group of people.
- These people are different from the subjects who participated in the
previous experiment. These new subjects will vote for the person in the pair
who they prefer to do the same task you have done but in a new experiment.
- That is, there is a group of people who are going to participate in a new
experiment and they have to decide who is going to be the observer in the
experiment they are going to play. The only information they have about
you and your partner is your decision regarding how to spend your points. If
you win the elections, then you will do the same task you have to do now but
with different subjects. For the second task you will have 200 points instead
of 100 points.
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8 Appendix 2. Histograms of the contribu-
tions
Figure 3. Histograms of the contributions in the PGG.
Cooperative scenario Non-cooperative scenario
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